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In this paper certain attractive explanations, present in sociological and other scholar­
ship, on the dismemberment of Yugoslavia are considered, by reviewing them in light of cer­
tain thus far unpublished survey and census data on the former Yugoslavia, immediately pre­
ceding the dismemberment. Particularly one influential, but biased explanation of the dissolu­
tion of the former Yugoslavia is considered. Books by the sociologist Stjepan Meštrović merit 
particular attention in the depiction of bias towards the Yugoslav break-up.
It is refuted that there was an in-depth incompatibility based on authoritarianism of any 
nationality’, on emotional instability' of any nationality, of ethnic stratification, of ethnic dis­
tance among the basic groups, which may explain the break-up. Instead, it is proposed that 
the break-up be explained by a maturation of nationalities, where the foimer Yugoslavia 
served as a nation-building institution, but for numerous nationalities.
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1. Introduction
The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia has attracted much scientific (not to speak of 
extra-scientific) attention. Of course, it has attracted the most attention in the very countries 
in question, and within their “scholarships”, i.e. “national sciences”. This holds true for soci­
ology, as well as for other social scientific disciplines.
It is attractive and challenging to explain political events, particular by those of great 
magnitude, by clear-cut, simple social and psychological factors, particularly those of a truly 
or allegedly in-depth nature. The dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 would be 
a likely case for such an explanation. Was dismemberment, possibly even its violent form, im­
minent, ensuing from the composition of the multi-national state, from the very nature of the 
nationalities and their inter-relations during the 70 year period of joint life in one state?
The main patterns of bias, even on the part of sociologists, onvolves the ethnic lines of 
the two major groups in the post-Yugoslav conflict during the 90s. Croatian social scientists 
are likely to see the conflict as Serbian aggression, due to the Serb national character (Letica, 
in Meštrović, 1996; Šakić, 1993), sometimes refined by rational choice as an explanation of 
Serb behavior (Štulhofer, 1993). Serb sociologists, on the other hand (Pečujlić and Nakarada, 
1995:49-71; Obrenović, 1994), stress the global dimensions of the event and the role of the 
international community, basically as a conspiracy, a world plot against the Serbian people. 
Both Croatian and Serbian scholars belittle ethnonationalism in their own ranks as “reac­
tive”. Sociologists from other ex-Yugoslav environments have been less active in these expla­
nations (one interesting exception is Hafner Fink, 1995).
We will concentrate in this paper on bias in a segment of the the English language so­
ciological scholarship, where one might have expected greater objectivity, or at any rate lack 
of bias. The paper focuses on examining authoritarianism, emotional imbalance, ethnic strat­
ification, ethnic distance, all social science variable-type concepts of promising explanatory 
value.
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2. Authoritarianism
The major socio-psychological explanation of the dissolution of Yugoslavia asserts a 
characteristic incompatibility between authoritarianism in one group and the absence of au­
thoritarianism, the tolerant personality - the democratically oriented personality, the loving 
and caring personality etc. - in another.
The idea of authoritarianism as the cause of the collapse of the Yugoslav state was par­
ticularly elaborated by the American sociologist S. G. Meštrović and his associates in their 
numerous books during the 90s. Meštrović's thesis, following D. Tomašić, an alleged “Weber 
of Communism” and “Tocqueville of the Slavs” (1993:19). Meštrović combines the idea of 
authoritarianism (which he understands to be in the original sense of Adorno et al. [1950] 
Meštrović, Letica and Goreta, 1993:13) with cultural incompatibility particularly between 
Serbs and Croats. Serbs, who are said to have descended from the Urals and Altaics 
(1993:50), and have traditionally been herdsmen, are said to have demonstrated a “social 
character” dominated by authoritarianism (1993:50), which manifested itself in “power hun­
ger, aggressiveness” (1993:51), “autocratic” tendencies (1993:50), “malevolence, deceit, dis­
orderly view of universe”, and which made them “emotionally unbalanced, violent, rebellious 
and (again) power-seeking personality” (63). Furthermore, the “disorganized personality 
structure or type of social character that preceded Communism” is to be linked to the 
“chronic alcoholic” and higher suicide rates (1993:64). In contrast to this portait of the Serb, 
one may find, according to these authors, among the Catholic nationalities, particularly 
among the Croats and Slovenians “a universalist base, a tendency towards pluralism, a recog­
nition of values pertaining to human rights, European political values” (1993:36).
Tomašić (1948) makes the comparison between two types of traditional society in the 
Balkans: the Dinaric kuća and the zadruga type. He combines of the depictions of the 
ethnogenetic, cultural, psychological and political traits of the two ways of life. The Dinaric 
kuća is, according to Tomašić, associated with joint and inalienable ownership of real estate 
and authoritarian power organization, in which males cannot express themselves, bringing 
about a set of traits including power seeking, emotional imbalance, overindulgence in affec­
tion, spitefulness, inclination to torture, inclination to violence, cruelty as a custom, deceit­
fulness, blood vengeance, hallucinations etc. In contrast to this, the zadruga household and 
society, to be found primarily among land cultivators, is permeated by the following features: 
“a general spirit of gaiety”, “singing”, harmony (“avoidance of conflict”, 1948:173), dislike of 
violence, freedom of anxiety and fear, “family control and political power are very limited” 
(1948:161), the achievement of “well-being of all”, the common good, “children are born un­
der happy circumstances” (1948:166), “lack of sharp stratification” (171) etc. Clearly Tomašić 
formulates two ideal types, which he links loosely to Serbs (in the former case) and Croats in 
the latter (mentioning some other groups in the Balkans, but not analysing them). His loose 
linkage would be admissible, if his corroborations were empirically valid. Unforturnately, he 
does not found his descriptions upon a systematic study of Balkan and Yugoslav society, but 
mainly invokes antiquated (at the time) ethnography and impressionistic travel accounts. His 
study of the role of religion is also lacking, as he mainly limits himself to statements such as 
“...the Catholic Church in the Dinaric regions was instrumental in weakening the clan ties, 
and in eliminating ancient customs not in accordance with the teachings of Christianity” 
(1948:86).
Furthermore, studies of the extended family in the Balkans have not found it to be di­
rectly linked to one nationality only, but have instead found it to be a mono-type group 
(known as the zadniga), characterised by 1. joint ownership of real estate and other property,
2. inalienability of real estate, 3. the immobility of males (males do not leave the extended 
family), 4. mobility of females (departure by marriage) and a consequent low social position 
of females, 5. a relatively low position of children in the family. (St. Erlich, 1971:345). It is a
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group distinct to the Slav South, states St. Erlich, and existed there until the beginning of the 
XX. century (with the exception of Slovenia), withering away at an uneven pace, though ev­
erywhere, under the influence of modernisation. Therefore, the basic theoretical mistake of 
Tomašić is in contrasting kuća and zadruga: they are both of one basic type, though regional, 
religious and other variations and degrees of dissolution varied. There is no reason to formu­
late these differences into two contrasting types. One should speak more correctly of the evo­
lution of the zadruga, its uneven disappearance and its regional variations.
This is an assertion which may be tested empirically, though possibly not in the loose 
sense in which various authors use the term “authoritarian”, similar terms including terms 
that are allegedly its opponents. What we are in a position to test is the presence of authori­
tarianism in the classical meaning established by Adorno and associates.
The data pertaining to the 1990-91 period have been taken from the investigation 
“Level of Living - LOC’, collected by the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Ljubljana from a sample of over 14,000 adults (Svetlik, 1991). Conditions for data collection 
were still allowing in most regions (though Kosovo is doubtful). The data were collected dur­
ing the years 1990-91, just a few months before the disappearance of the Yugoslav state. The 
indicator of authoritarianism is composed of three items (“Leaderless, every people [nation­
ality] is as if decapitated”; “There are two major types of people in the world, the strong and 
the weak”; “The most important thing children need to be taught is obedience towards par­
ents”. A fourth item was disregarded, owing to its lack of fit both empirically and meaning­
fully (“Superiors need to be obeyed, regardless of whther they are right” - at the time of the 
study, it would have been unclear whether these “superiors” were to be socialist leaders, new 
multi-party leaders and business owners, new ethnic populists, petty owners, managers, old 
aparatchicks etc.).












(Legend: 1 = total absence of authoritarianism, 3 = total presence of authoritarianism)
The results, as indicated in Table 1, point to a prevalence of authoritarianism in the for­
mer Yugoslavia. At the time the prevalence was absolute in all regions, the former republics 
and provinces. On a scale from 1 to 3, the average presence of authoritarianism was 2.44, in­
dicating a definite predominance. One might argue that this predominance is overblown by 
the presence of the third item, which could also be indicative of patriarchal traditionalism.
The general prevalence of authoritarianism could be regarded as a product of the cir­
cumstance of economic crisis coupled by the delegitimation of the entire institutional system;
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it also may may have been linked to pre-modern modes of social life (studies of authoritari­
anism in the former Yugoslavia always found it to be high and prevalent). It forms a favour­
able socio-psychological background for the action of demagogue politicians, as authoritari­
ans can be expected to be conducive to manipulation, particularly of the kind instigating col­
lective fears.
Among the major groups, we find Albanians and Macedonians to be somewhat more au­
thoritarian. One could further expect authoritarianism to diminish going from the West to the 
East in the former Yugoslavia, the western-most parts being the first to advance the 
multi-party system, with the Serbs presented as “the lions” in Pareto's meaning, suppressing 
changes in the political system. We do not find here any tendency among Serbs to be more au­
thoritarian than the average, as suggested by Meštrović and others: in fact, somewhat surpris­
ingly, Slovenians are slightly above the average and Serbs are slightly below. It may be noted 
that the presence and intensity of authoritarianism is most clearly tied to the level of schooling, 
with almost no strong non-authoritarians to be found among the unschooled (C = .343). The 
differences among the nationalities cannot be attributed to educational attainment differences 
alone. It is to be noted that those declaring themselves to be Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense are 
the least authoritarian, the sole group with only a slight predominance of a non-authoritarian 
orientation. It is interesting that Montenegrins are also relatively low on the authoritarianism 
scale, which is in accordance with the traditional stereotype of their rebellious nature.
Besides pointing to a general predominance of authoritarianism, which may be re­
garded as fertile grounds for political manipulation (and for the rise of ethnonationalism, xe­
nophobia and populist demagogical politics), these data do not point to any significant differ­
ences, particularly not those which could have been expected from claims in scholarly litera­
ture on Serb authoritarianism and on authoritarian stands and personality types producing 
dictatorships. To the contrary, at the begninning of the 90s Macedonians found a peaceful (at 
the time) way out of Yugoslavia, remained without a charismatic leader in the process. By 
way of contrast, Serbs and Croats, who have produced more than their share of charismatic 
leaders and populist ethnonationalist politics in the 90s, do not appear to be more authori­
tarian. This would mean that authoritarianism is tied more to traditionalism tan to what was 
originally attributed to it (Adorno et al., 1950).
Our analysis of authoritarianism was based on a high level of homegeneity (in the statis­
tical meaning) of the said items (3 statements). But could, nevertheless, an analysis of indi­
vidual items produce a different picture of authoritarianism before the dismemberment of 
Yugoslavia? None of the three items points to any surprises.
Other researchers arrived to similar results, studying youth at the time of the disappear­
ance of Yugoslavia (1988). The investigation was a survey of youth. Youth from Croatia were 
somewhat less authoritarian than the average (37% in comparison to 51%), but those from 
Serbia did not deviate from the average. (D. Pantić in S. Mihajlović et al., 1990:189).
These findings may be interpreted as pointing to the fact that multi-party democracy 
and a smooth transition “saved” Slovenia and Macedonia from the possibility of an ethno- 
centist regime and a politics of conflict (though in Macedonia only temporarily), and they 
make improbable any assertion of an in-depth cultural basis for democratization. The transi­
tion to democracy was not deeply culturally and socially psychologically embedded in any of 
the ethnic environments, as had been asserted, e.g. by Meštrović and associates. On the con­
trary, it was mostly an affair within the elite, where tolerant and moderate forces would or 
would not prevail.
3. Emotional Imbalance
On the socio-psychological level, it may be even more interesting to see whether there 
are indications of emotional imbalance and personality disorganization, which is also suggested
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by Meštrović (1993:59-81), and in another way by other authors (J. Rašković, based on his 
psychiatric experience, in a loose treatment of the matter and at a critical moment, linked 
Croats to the castration complex, Serbs to the Oedipal character, and Muslims to the anal, 
1991:128-129). In earlier anthropological literature, St. Erlich (1971) notes of conscripts 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Austro-Hungarian armed forces that they were often di­
agnosed with psychiatric conditions (1971:383-387), but without specifying the issue of which 
ethnic groups were at issue.
It follows from Meštrović's argument, that authoritarianism may be linked to emotional 
instability which manifests itself in heavy drinking, finding alcoholism as an outlet (1993:64). 
This, again, would express itself in a greater consumption of alcohol among Serbs and in the 
eastern part of the former Yugoslavia in general. The 1991 survey provides data on that is­
sue. We shall present only data as to daily consumption of alcoholic beverage, indicative of a 
habit, by nationality:
Table 2. Percentage of habitual acohoiic beverage consumers among adult population, self-report, 











The data point to characteristic differences, but diverge from Meštrović's assertion: 
those belonging to the Christian Orthodox religions are not heavier drinkers in the sense of 
having a greater frequency of regularity and habit. Regular drinking seems to be under the 
influence of cultural factors: in particular, Islam forbids alcohol consumption and it is char­
acteristic that it has a definite impact upon the behaviour of ethnic Albanians only, but no 
longer on the behavior of the Muslims/Bosniaks, who were known to be modernised. The im­
pact of social admissibility due to culture upon alcohol consumption and of modernization in 
general is also discernible. In fact, it is Croatians and Slovenes, two predominantly Catholic 
nationalities, who diverge slightly upwards from the average. Similar conlusions would result 
from other measures of alcohol and tranquilizer consumption. Data on reports of anxiety, 
depression and other psychological problems and troubles, from the same investigation, as to 
the past 12 months are not revealing either (the average presence of self-reported psycholog­
ical conditions was 6.8%, undoubtedly less than today).
From earlier findings, we may note those of V. St. Erlich, in her studies of the Yugoslav 
family from the 1930s. She noted that there were slight differences in the level of heavy 
drinking among the regions she defined as Serbia (proper), “Christian Bosnia” and continen­
tal Croatia. The level is above one half in “Christian Bosnia” only and slightly, pertaining to 
males only. The other two regions diverge only slightly. She notes that drinking became fre­
quent and heavy among Bosnian Muslims after World War I. Slovenia was not part of her 
study. (1971:322-329). Neither do her findings lend no support to the theroy of “emotional 
imbalance” finding its outlet in alcoholism among Serbs in particular.
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Another, possibly more valid indicator of emotional instability and personality disorga­
nization could be found in the rate of suicides (not suggested by Meštrović and associates). 
Our insight into the matter emphasizing that during the 80s, the rate of suicide in the then 
Yugoslavia fluctuated around 1.6-1.8, with a slight trend towards a rise during the period. 
Croats (1982 = 2.12, 1986 = 2.33) and particularly Slovenians (2.42, 3.42) were above the 
Yugoslav average, while Muslims (0.94, 0.88) and particularly Albanians (0.02 and 0.02)1 
were the lowest. Serbs and Montengrins were around the Yugoslav average. (Demografska 
statistika 1982, 1986:227, Demografska statistika 1986, 1990:231). These disparities could be 
explained by religious factors, though it may be easier and more veracious if they were linked 
to general modernization. These data, however, mask the basic finding that suicide rates 
were higher in northern areas, particularly the Pannonian belt of the former Yugoslavia, an 
issue raising many questions, which can be answered mainly in an asociological manner. 
None of this gives any support for the Meštrović thesis whatsover.
4. Ethnic Stratification
Another often stated allegation, also of an ideological nature, but to be found in schol­
arly literature as well (examined by Flere, 1992, asserted by Letica, in Meštrović, 1996: 
99-100) is that the dissolution of the Yugoslav state resulted from an inherent not only domi­
nation of one nationality, but also its manifestation via social stratification: to put it sociolog­
ically, that social stratification had the substance of ethnic stratification.2 Not only did one 
nationality have a politically dominant position, but this position is also to be found in the so­
cial composition. Letica quotes the findings on stratification of the former Yugoslavia by 
Lazić.
In an article titled “The Genesis of the Current Balkan War”, Letica considers the so­
cial stratification of the former Yugoslavia and boldly states that ethnic stratification had a 
pattern where “the social status of Serbs was that of a kind of 'ruling nation' in Croatia” 
(1996:96). Invoking Lazić (without specifically quoting him), Letica underscores that the 
Serbs were proportionally overrepresented in the then Communist Party of Yugoslavia, “a 
necessary precondition for upward mobility”, and that “a similar arrangement existed among 
the elites, in which was concentrated the largest share of political and financial power” 
(1996:97), adding a special note to the analysis by stating that “the data show that Serbs, and 
even more so the 'Yugoslavs', obtained state-owned housing with significantly greater ease 
than Croats.” (1996:98). The “ease” of which Letica speaks is difficult to measure and test, 
but he was probably trying to say that Serbs and Yugoslavs more often received state housing 
(“dwelling rights”).
Lazić did in fact conduct an empirical study of stratification in Croatia on the eve of the 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (1990-01) He studies both stratification at the time and 
mobility in the prior decades. He also deals with dwelling, but his findings are completely at 
variance with the allegations attributed to him. “Croatians live in somewhat larger apart­
ments than Serbs and Yugoslavs (the differences are statistically insignificant), and their 
apartments were better equipped, but Yugoslavs, along with the Serbs more often received 
dwelling right apartments” (1994:169). Of course, this is just one detail in the study of strati­
fication, though Lazić would agree with Letica and Meštrović that it is a relevant one.
1 Reporting for Kosovo may have been lacking.
2 We will not enter into the allegations with contrary political tendencies, i.e. that in Tito's Yugoslav 
leadership Serbs were underrepresented and had a subservient position. This does deal with stratifica­
tion and fits more into the theory of the Yugoslav dissolution as a conspiracy, which was fashionable 
among Serbian intellectuals.
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Neverthless, Lazić's true findings are completely different from those suggested by Letica 
and Meštrović: “Neither Croats nor Serbs were significantly more represented (at the begin­
ning of the 90s) neither at the peak nor at the bottom of the social hierarchy.” (1994:168). In 
his detailed analysis, Lazić would not say that the stratification pictures of the ethnic groups 
in question were totally identical, though they were increasingly becoming so: Serbs were 
more often agriculturists and unqualified workers, were less educated and were more often 
in the activity of protection and repression (but he warns, those were mostly jobs of a routine 
nature, watchers, keepers and policemen). Though Lazić takes a very critical view of the so­
cial system of the former Yugoslavia (from a Marxist stand, considering it to be a society 
dominated by of the class of “collective owners”), he admits that the policy of ethnic parity in 
the former Yugoslavia produced results in the area of stratification, allowing for somewhat 
greater rates of upward mobility for Serbs, in view of their relatively low starting position 
within Croatia (1994:170-1).
It is undisputed that in Croatia Serbs were more often members of the League of Com­
munists. But this fact needs to be analyzed. Firstly, membership itself did not necessarily 
mean, in fact for the majority it did not mean, any share or stake in the distribution of power, 
as it was a mammoth organization. To this end, the composition of the elites needs to be 
taken into account. Secondly, membership in the League of Communists needs to be ana­
lyzed on its role as being an instrument extending social protection and a sort of security in 
surroundings where individuals were in a minority position ethnically. Therefore, in the Yu­
goslav setting membership in the League of Communists may best be explained as a form of 
social capital, which would also entail that it enable and foster upward mobility, as well as of 
social control. Lazić explains this datum particularly in connection with the historical back­
ground, Serbs more often taking part in the Partisan Movement (but not in Serbia itself), 
which led them to leaning towards the Communist Party and using it as a mobility vehicle in 
a situation where their educational resources were more scarce in comparison to those of 
Croats, but this process was to have ended at the beginning of the dismembrment of Yugo­
slavia. (1994:181-184). Lastly, a certain cultural electivity and affinity of Orthodoxy towards 
Communism needs to be studied, though it is easy to slip towards prejudicial statements in 
this respect.
As to membership in the League of Communists, ethnic belonging is not as universally 
structured in the pro-Serb trend, as Letica would have it. In 1991, the Svetlik survey data 
(1991) indicate that Serbs were overrepresented in League membership, if the Yugoslavia is 
considered, but within Serbia proper, at the onset of the 90s, the number of Serbs in the 
League was slightly below average (18.8% in comparison to 19.9% as the average of mem­
bership in the Serbian sample), a finding which fits our comments on the social (not cultural) 
nature of membership in the then Yugoslavia. It could also fit into historical data indicating 
that Serbs from Serbia proper did not support Tito's Partisans. One should also note that 
Serbs were always to be found overrepresented among the ex-members, a fact which Letica 
does not consider either.
In a situation when the number of members of the Communist Party was a major frac­
tion of the active population, other criteria for determining the elite were of greater rele­
vance and indication.
From the 1991 findings it is possible to pursue the ossie of ethnic stratification using 
better sociological perspectives and instruments. We shall pay attention to a number of di­
mensions of social stratification.
In 1991, the Yugoslav survey did not indicate any revealing differences. When asked 
whether their jobs entailed executive competencies (management, leading positions), ethnic 
belonging did would not demonstrate the systematic priviliged position of any ethnic group. 
The figures are as follows:
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No pattern appears. Certain deviations among the lesser groups can be distinguished.
Control by education, in line with the idea of meritocracy, reveals lesser deviations in 
representation, with Montengrins, those declared as Yugoslavs and Slovenians being more 
represented, which is of no assistance not an indication of the assertions.
The above data illustrate, if anything, that in the former Yugoslav state, there was a pol­
icy of ethnic parity, which functioned, though without attaining the ultimate goal of ethnic 
harmony.
Only highly educated Albanians and Montenegrins seem to be less represented as exec­
utives (possibly, owing to a smaller share of those with higher education). The other nation­
alities higher educated shares all have executive positions in more than one fourth of the 
number of respondents. “Yugoslavs” are to be found among the younger respondents who 
have not yet attained executive positions.
For a final assessment, we will consider another set of data, those from the 1987 survey 
(“Class substance”, N. Toš, head). That survey had a particularly large sample (15.976). Ob­
serving the occupational structure, we focus our attention on two groups in which power can 
be considered to be concentrated: organizational business managers and political functionar­
ies. In analyzing the structure by ethnic identification we find the following:
Table 4. Percentage of business managers and political functionaries in adult population, 











Flere, S.: Blind Alleys in Variable Type Explanations... Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXXIII. (2002), No 1-2: 71-85
Within the same survey, when respondents were asked whether they ever held an office 
within the self-management and one-party system, significant deviations from the average of 
14.8% appeared, with 3 groups slightly deviating from the average upwards (Montenegrins, 
“Yugoslavs” and Slovenians). There is no indication of a national disparity pattern.
Ethnic stratification as a cause for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia can be flatly re­
futed, with one possible exception, regarding the “niche” of repressive services (the army and 
the police), which would not have mattered much when the political system was functioning, 
but which demonstrated itself during the war, in the fact and mode of dismemberment of the 
federal army in 1991-92. But this essentially was not a matter of ethnic stratification, but of 
the political system, allowing the armed forces to remain without a commander in chief. Dur­
ing the functioning of the state of Yugoslavia, this did not in any significant way change the 
chances for promotion or lack of such chances within any ethnic groups, nor have an influ­
ence upon the nature of social stratification. Neither of the two authors dealing with social 
stratification at the end of the Yugoslav era, Lazić and Hafner Fink, pays any attention to 
these groups (Lazić, 1987, 1994; Hafner Fink, 1995).
There are no empirical grounds for entertaining an opinion on the existince of a ruling 
nationality in the former Yugoslavia (we shall not enter into the issue of the institutional ar­
rangement to this end, a very elaborate one). To be sure some nationalities were more nu­
merous in absolute terms, resulting on the fact that the number of managers and functionar­
ies being the largest in the largest nationality. The main disproportions are usually to be 
found in the overrepresentation of Montenegrins, as was known from common sense experi­
ence and the underrepresentation of Albanians, the group educationally and otherwise the 
most underdeveloped. One may also raise the question as to who were the Yugoslavs, which 
is beyond the scope of this paper (see Sekulić et al., 1994).
The issue of stratification and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia was treated at greater 
length by Hafner Fink, on the basis of the 1987 data and with the major available types of 
statistical analysis. His findings pointed to major differences among the republics and prov­
inces of the former state, primarily due to varying levels of modernization and different cul­
tural traditions, but not to the systematic privileged position of any one nationality. This 
brought about differences in the size of the varying classes, with the lower being class the 
largest in Kosovo and the smallest in Slovenia and with a reverse situation as to the upper 
class. However, as to the type of stratification, Hafner Fink found that only Kosovo departed 
from the basic in-depth pattern: there was economic status to be found independent of edu­
cational and occupational status. That was primarily to be explained by the underdeveloped 
nature of the province (low level of economic development, high level of unemployment, 
high illiteracy, extremely high fertility - in comparison to all other units of Yugoslavia), by 
the existence of the extended family and other defining circumstances. (Hafner Fink, 1995: 
66, 125-7). Everywhere else there would have been two basic hierarchies to be found: gen­
eral social position (composed of educational-occupational status, economic-consumption 
status and cultural status/style of life) and political status. It is very relevant that the latter 
was not to be linked to the former, extending a negative answer to the often heard assertion 
that there was political dominance of the stratification structure in Yugoslav real-socialism. 
Hafner-Fink would allow only that the dominance of the political sphere would assert itself 
via general educational indoctrination, giving a picture in which the educational hierarchy is 
the major stratificational dimension (1995:75-92). However, he does not deal with the issue 
of cultural incompatibility of nationalities. He concludes that “social cleavages (leading to 
the dismemberment) do not completely coincide with republic boundaries” (1995:189).
5. Ethnic Distance
Another sociological method for to explaining the dissolution of Yugoslavia was to un­
cover a rise in social distance, both in the manner of behaviour (interethnic marriages) and
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by way of social distance attitude measurements. It has been alleged that prior to the 
break-up, a rise in social distance came about, and that the dissolution somehow followed 
from this in-depth pattern.
Ethnic distance was a matter of empirical study in the former Yugoslavia, particularly 
by social psychologists, and in such a way that it is possible to uncover trends: from 1966 on­
wards, ethnic distance generally fell, whereas in contrast it rose in the 80s. The patterns are 
characteristic and indicate cultural, denominational, linguistic, historical and other circum­
stances. In fact, social distance in the latter half of the 80s was clearly on the rise. This could 
be explanatory as to the dismemberment of the state, as those stating a decided ethnic dis­
tance (with respect to marriage) were Slovenians (65%) and Albanians (69%) (the political 
behavior of these two nationalities could be called separatist or nationally emancipatory), if 
it were considered a spontaneous and autonomous phenomenon. Among all other groups 
this was a minority phenomenon, the lowest, of course, appearing among those declaring 
themselves to be Yugoslavs (22%) (D. Pantić in L. Baćević [ed.], 1991:103). It was a minority 
phenomenon among all the nationalities to be found in the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Among those to be found in armed conflicts, only in the case if Albanians 
was it a majority phenomenon (in all directions). It should be marked that ethnic distance 
was below the Yugoslav average in Croatia (29%), and even lower in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (figure lacking3), both of which show figures below the Yugoslav average of 
44%. (Pantić in Baćević, 1991:103-5). By another count, three years earlier strong social dis­
tance was expressed in Croatia by 22% and in Bosnia by 31% of adult respondents (Šiber, 
1987:82-86).In no case, however, does this follow the pattern of Yugoslav conflicts, nor can it 
uphold the thesis that the Yugoslav break-down was a spontaneous process, without political 
intervention and propaganda instigation. At the time of the Pantić and Baćević data collec­
tion in 1990, years of not only economic crisis, but also propaganda warfare, ideological insti­
gation and hate speech had already passed.
In another way, Hodson and associates (1994) reject the idea of the existence of an 
in-depth psychological ethnic conflict as the cause of the Yugoslav break-up, by studying a se­
ries of indicators of “ethnic tolerance” in the former Yugoslavia (1994:1554). In fact Hodson 
and associates lead to the conclusion that ethnic conflict results from the relative size of a 
certain ethnic group, “preconditions for armed conflict being less present in more homoge­
nous settings” (1994:1555). Thus, despite relatively low degrees of tolerance Slovenia re­
mained the most quiet and peaceful region.
A detailed analysis of ethnic distance in the former Yugoslavia indicates that larger eth­
nic groups demonstrated less distance (were more open), that cultural differences from the 
Serbo-Croatian speaking majority played a role (Albanians and Slovenians expressing 
greater distance), that the situation was complicated by a certain number expressing 
themeslves to be Yugoslavs in the ethnic meaning (those were the most tolerant, open and 
universalist, in fact this very declaration had such a latent meaning), and that in the latter 
half of the 80s, when a general crisis developed, and an authoritarian mode of thinking be­
came prominent, demanding a scapegoat, distance rose. The high figures to be found in Yu­
goslavia on the eve of the break-up did not meet some of the data reached elsewhere in Eu­
3 In 1990, according to Pantić, among youths in the then Yugoslavia, in Croatia strong and very 
strong ethnic distancing was found among 34% of Croatians, 26% of Serbs. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
another republic to be stricken by war just a few years later, such distancing was expressed by 49% of 
Croatians, by 34% of Serbs and by 37% of Bosniaks/Muslims. In contrast, such strong and very strong 
distancing was expressed by 65% of Slovenians and peaking at a level of 72% among Albanian youth in 
Kosovo. It was, therefore, much higher in regions not to be lit by war in the following years (if we may to 
say that the Kosovo conflict erupted almost a decade later) (Pantić, in Baćević [ed.], 1991:104).
80
Flere, S.: Blind Alleys in Variable Type Explanations., Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXXIII. (2002), No 1-2: 71-85
rope, e.g. in Finland, two fifths would not be prepared to accept Muslims even as neighbours. 
Close in expressions social distance are Romanians and Slovaks, with rates of over 30% ex­
pressing such an unwillingness ('http://rcul.uni-lj.si/~fd adp/opisi/WVS 95-en.XML).
6. Rationalization
This situation indicates that social distance, though increasing in the 80s, could not be 
considered a factor in the dismemberment of the former state and particularly not as a cause 
of war, as the latter came about particularly in areas of low social distance (Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina).
Another interesting point in the views of Dr. Meštrović concerns the various levels of 
rationalization of social life, which are said to have made life in the joint Yugoslav state in­
compatible. It is known in sociological theory that McDonaldization is taken to be a form of 
rationalization in Weber's meaning of the term, yet different from bureaucracy. (Ritzer, 
1993).
Dr. Meštrović, in his answers as expert witness before the Hague tribunal stated: 
“There's McDonald's openings in Zagreb and Belgrade but not as many, of course, as there 
would be in Miami. It's a continuum” (Transcript, June 27, 2000, p. 21621).
In this case, Meštrović, in his prejudice can be found to be flatly wrong. McDonald's was 
opened in Belgrade, which was Serbian, Orthodox, Communist at the time (1987) almost a 
decade before it was opened in Zagreb, which was Catholic, democratic, belonging to the 
cultural West (1996). It is very improbable that McDonald's opened its first outlet in a com­
munist land exclusively out of pure instrumental rationality.
In fact this is indicative both of the way Meštrović chooses his indicators and of his dis­
regard for facts. It is also characteristic of how Meštrović plants indicators into some grand 
sociological theory, invoking the grandest of sociological classics, but without regard for the 
rules of logic.
7. Conclusion
Sociological and other social science explantions of such complex phenomena are nec­
essary and possible. They are rarely to be found in variable type anayses. Much of the schol­
arship on the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia was biased, “instant history”, superfluous 
and dictated by immediate conditions. But the work of Meštrović and associates supersedes 
spontaneous bias and prejudice. It it directly and to a full extent an abuse of sociology. One 
could mention in passing that any sociological enterprise pretending to explain events and 
phenomena by preordained characteristics of a nationality is out of touch with contrmporary 
theory which stresses the nature nationalities as “imagined communities” and “communities 
of memory”.
Attention should be paid to the interplay of the following factors and circumstances:
1. a particular set of historical solutions and events, involving the imposition of coerced 
political and institutional arrangements (implying that the arrangment never arose from an 
in-depth consensus), characteristic of the history of Yugoslavia, and out of touch with demo­
cratic developments in the XX. century (a problem which we cannot doiscuess here in partic­
ular, but which includes both pre- and the post-World War II Yugoslavia),
2. the post-modern condition in which the state ceases to mean what it did a century
ago,
3. the break-down of state socialism, bringing about a general deconstruction and re­
construction of society,
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4. the particular role played by hate speech in the media at the end of the 80s in the for­
mer Yugoslavia,
5. the cessation of the unique role of Yugoslavia as a buffer zone between the two cold 
war “camps”, removing the external pressure for internal conflicts to activate and manifest 
themselves,
6. the role of the old and the would be new elites during the late 80s, when it was evi­
dent that Communism would break down, at the level of the new states, in their attempts ei­
ther to retain or to gain power, manipulating and instigating disintegrative processes, i.e. pro­
cesses of constituting new states (those achieved and those not achieved, particularly 
“Greater Serbia”). These circumstances are sufficient to explain the Yugoslav break-up, 
needing elaboration in the matter of depicition of the phenomenal level and explanation of 
the interplay of factors,
7. the maturing of nationalities, tending towards the formation of nation states, a pro­
cess whereby Yugoslav nationalities were at the time of the 1980s crisis constituted nationali­
ties and which could not merge into a new nation.
This proved to be the basic underlying fact into which all the others fit and make sense. 
All forms of crises, geopolitical changes, use and abuse of propaganda, the behavior of old 
and new elites and leaders and their interactions all of this makes sense only within the sup­
position that Yugoslav nationalities at the time had matured, had come “of age” and did not 
in fact need a multi-national political sponsor or protector within which to function. Under­
standing nationalities to be Durkheimian social facts at the time also helps in sidelining the 
irrelevancies (the appearances of thre greatest conflict being among Slovenes and Serbs, the 
various daily events and personalities).
The Yugoslav federal state was no longer of much use to them, even had it been a much 
organizationally better and more legitimate one. During the Yugoslav state, the major ethnic 
groups grew in cultural, economic and every other way as separate and distinct entities with 
only the shell of a common state structure. The federal state structure, even though authori­
tarian throughout, was also polyarchic throughout the period. This polyarchy was of a 
pluri-ethnical nature, favouring the development of separate ethnic groups and their political 
entities within Yugoslavia. Tito's policy of ethnic parity worked within this process against the 
merging of ethnicities, but also against the formation of a consensual and consociational 
multi-national entity, as the leaders increasingly depended upon their ethnic power bases. 
The fact that the nationalities were the basic units of Yugoslavia and not the instituional ter­
ritorial units can be best illustrated by the differences in the fate of the mono-ethnic Kosovo 
and the multi-ethnic Vojvodina, not to speak of the ensuing wars.
One could note an exception to the otherwise lack of functionality of Yugoslavia for all 
the major nationalities: Serbs from outside Serbia, a factor which - accidental circumstances 
aside - is what sparked the major conflict.
The Yugoslav narrative, including the dismemberment, fits into what could today be 
called modernism in the explanation of nationalities: Yugoslavia was a “nation-building” ve­
hicle for Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks, Macedonians, Albanians, even for the Montenegrins, 
less so for the Serbs, definitely not for the lesser ethnic groups. It was so even though they 
were mostly unaware and thought of the Yugoslav state, for better or for worse, as those ex­
isting paramount institution. History was in the making behind the backs of the Yugoslav na­
tionalities. In this peculiar type of nation-making - of many nationalities within one federal 
state - H. Seton Watson can be considered to have correctly identified them as historically 
“new nations” (1977).
This was linked to an overall social modernization. From today's perspective the differ­
ing levels of modernization of ethnicities and regions can be assessed to have stimulated dis­
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integration, though not in its own right, but by enhancing ethnonational identity and compre­
hending Yugoslavia ever more as “fetters” to one's ethnonational development. The role of 
religious faith become clearer: in spite of the many clerical declaration s on the promotion of 
tolerance, religion is “not an expressopn or a handle so much as a major part of such (na­
tional) identities” (2000:13), as Ruby notes, stressing its transformed primordiality.
The break-up scene could be viewed as a matter of an alliance of ethnic politicians and 
intellectuals (the so called independent, opposition or dissident intellectuals) who formed a 
coalition to instigate feelings of ethnic frustration and a need for immediate action (explain­
ing the state of crisis within their nation in terms of the inadequate position of their national­
ity within the Yugoslav federation). The old elites and the the would-be elites of that time (in 
some of the countries, e.g. in Croatia, politicians were practically lacking) were using the 
ideological tools of ethnic hatred, blaming other ethnic groups, as tools in the rationally per­
ceived situation of the break-up of communism and the struggle to form the new political 
elite. These new elites, (at the level of each newly forming state) used and abused every 
means of propaganda available, including what is today called hate speech, in its most varied 
forms, particularly in the form of planting news about events which would spark deep rooted 
collective fears. The use of television was of the utmost importance, and the Yugoslav drama, 
starting in the latter half of the 80s, was a drama of simulacra (televised stories, which were 
not necessarily be true, but functioned in mobilizing the masses not so much Hitler-like, xe­
nophobic propaganda as unbielevable narratives of alleged attocities). The lack of a 
pan-Yugoslav television system was also a contributing fact, enabling the elites to monopolise 
“the truth.”
At a deeper level, Yugoslavs of those times were confronted by the impossibility of ad­
aptation of the political and economic system of the former SFRY to changes in the environ­
ment, particularly owing to institutional reasons. This meant that the legitimacy crisis could 
not have evolved into a sustainable transformation of the political system, probably even with 
major assistance from abroad (with the exception of a protectorate, which, of course, is 
hardly imaginable).
At the deepest level, a multi-national state could not have functioned indefnitely in the 
case of Yugoslavia, owing to a history of ethnic conflict (almost exclusively in the XX cen­
tury), blowing each crisis to dramatic proportions and apocaliptic interpretations on the part 
of ideologists of each major ethnic group), pointing to the nationalities becoming mature 
“social facts”.
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Članak raspravlja o odabranim “atraktivnim” studijama i objašnjenji­
ma raspadanja bivše Jugoslavije. Za preispitivanje i odbacivanje jedne od naj­
raširenijih hipoteza, one Stjepana Meštrovića - da je raspad bivše Jugoslavije 
povezan s duboko ugrađenim neskladom među nacijama članicama, a koji se 
nesklad temelji na autoritarizmu, emocionalnoj nestabilnosti, etničkoj stratifi­
kaciji i etničkoj distanci - koristili smo neobjavljene anketne i popisne podat­
ke. Umjesto te, članak predlaže pretpostavku da bi raspad Jugoslavije bilo 
moguće objasniti sazrijevanjem naroda, pri čemu je savezna država Jugoslavi­
ja poslužila brojnim narodima kao institucija građenja nacije (nation-buil- 
ding).
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